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Have You Heard the News? 
How Real-Life Expectations React to Publicity
*
 
As evidence is accumulating that subjective expectations influence behavior and that these 
expectations are sometimes biased, it becomes policy-relevant to know how to influence 
individuals' expectations. Information in the media is likely to affect how people picture the 
future. This paper studies the role of public information dissemination, or publicity, in a real-
life expectations formation process. For this purpose, an exceptional Dutch dataset on 
monthly expectations regarding the future eligibility age for old age social security is 
analyzed. On average, the publicity reaction in eligibility age expectations is small but the 
differences among subgroups are considerable. I find that higher educated and high income 
groups hardly adapt their expectations to relevant publicity. On the contrary, those who do 
not often read a newspaper have a relatively high publicity reaction. A potential explanation 
for this latter finding is that these groups have low quality initial expectations. If this is true, 
publicity thus particularly benefits the initially worse informed groups. 
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Economists like to believe that expectations play a role in almost every de-
cision that economic agents make. In our models, retailers for example have
beliefs over competitors' future prices while determining their own price and
households are assumed to take their unemployment risk into account be-
fore signing a mortgage contract. The academic debate on the actual role
of expectations in decision-making is still ongoing though. An expanding
literature relates subjective expectations, sometimes measured in probabili-
ties, to individual behavior such as saving, criminal activities and smoking.
Interesting papers on the relationship between observed expectations and
observed actions include Stephens (2004), Lochner (2007) and Viscusi and
Hakes (2008). While I have tried to contribute to this literature in an earlier
paper (Van der Wiel, 2008) by showing that old age social security expec-
tations are related to pension scheme participation, the current paper takes
one step back.
In this paper I study how public information dissemination in°uences
observed expectations for di®erent demographic groups. As more and more
evidence is being presented that subjective expectations are important in
decision-making, policy-makers would like to know whether expectations
can be in°uenced through information dissemination in the media. This
is important when individuals' expectations are overly optimistic or overly
pessimistic. Two examples in the literature of systematically biased ex-
pectations are the yen/dollar exchange rate expectations that were too low
for Japanese exporting companies (Ito, 1990) and the probabilities of ob-
taining certain diseases that were too high for Dutch women (Carman and
Kooreman, 2007). In assessing the importance of the publicity reaction, I
am answering the call for more knowledge on the underlying mechanism
generating expectations by both Manski (2004) in his in°uential paper on
measuring expectations1 and by Bernanke (2007) in his speech for the NBER
monetary economics summer workshop2.
In this paper I speci¯cally examine the in°uence of newspaper publicity
on the degree to which individuals' social security expectations change over
time. Public information dissemination, or publicity, is de¯ned here as the
information concerning the entity at interest that is disseminated through
various public media outlets. Publicity can thus contain both new infor-
mation and repetitions of information that was already known. I ¯nd that
the aggregate publicity reaction of Dutch households in their old age social
1\I see a critical need for basic research on expectations formation. Understanding how
persons revise their expectations with receipt of new information often is a prerequisite for
credible use of econometric decision models to predict behavior." (Manski, 2004, p.1371)
2\We must understand better [...] the relationship between policy actions and the
formation of in°ation expectations." [...] A fuller understanding of the public's learning
rules would improve the central bank's capacity [...] to evaluate the implications of its
policy decisions and communications strategy."(Bernanke, 2007, p.4)
2security expectations is small, but that certain subgroups of the population,
such as the middle-aged and those who infrequently read a newspaper, adapt
their expectations relatively often in publicity-rich periods.
Unlike the majority of papers in the empirical expectations formation
literature (e.g. Gramlich, 1983, Caskey, 1985, Keane and Runkle, 1990,
Souleles, 2004 and Lamla and Lein, 2008), I will not base my ¯ndings on
in°ation expectations. Instead I will analyze the in°uence of publicity on
Dutch old age social security expectations, speci¯cally focusing on individ-
uals' expectations regarding the future eligibility age3. I am not the ¯rst
to look at these expectations. As U.S. social security expectations are best
documented, the literature mostly focuses on Americans' perception of their
old age bene¯ts (e.g. Dominitz, Manski and Heinz, 2003). Subjective social
security expectations have been studied mostly in order to understand the
impact of social security policy on retirement savings (e.g. Bernheim and
Levin, 1989, Dominitz et al., 2002 and Van der Wiel, 2008).
A major advantage of the Dutch eligibility age expectations over the U.S.
expectations is that there cannot be valuable private information involved
when Dutch individuals consider the future of their old age social security
system. Future bene¯ts perceptions in the U.S. are in°uenced by individual
health, job security and income expectations, besides future policy expecta-
tions. The same holds for in°ation expectations: private information plays
an important role as absorbed price information is so di®erent across con-
sumers. Unlike the U.S. system, Dutch old age social security is uniform
and universal, and expectations regarding its future will therefore only re-
°ect general policy expectations. The information set that individuals could
use in forming expectations would for example include the debates and de-
cisions of the Dutch Parliament as well as Statistics Netherlands' estimates
of future population growth. This information is all publicly known. A
lack of relevant private information is necessary in order to distinguish the
publicity reactions of di®erent demographic groups. If unobservable private
information would also play a role in the eligibility age expectations, I could
never separate di®erences in information absorption from di®erences in the
available information set.
Like in most of the expectations formation literature based on survey
data (e.g. Carroll, 2003, Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers, 2003, Souleles, 2004,
and Branch, 2004), I also observe a high degree of heterogeneity in the level
of expectations. The theoretical model that is the basis for my empirical
analysis takes this heterogeneity explicitly into account. I then propose a
novel method of assessing the in°uence of publicity on expectations. This
will be done by estimating the proportion of the variance in expectation
3The Dutch old age social security system, `AOW', is a universal Pay-As-You-Go
pension scheme that is currently rewarded to all Dutch citizens from the age of 65 onwards.
The monthly amount an individual receives is independent of contributions, income or
wealth.
3changes that can be attributed to a publicity reaction. The variance is the
relevant unit of analysis here as I am interested in all publicity reactions;
i.e. in both positive and negative expectations shifts. The estimator is
named the Publicity Reaction Coe±cient (PRC) and is estimated for di®er-
ent demographic and media consumption groups. To produce the PRC I use
two Dutch datasets: the Pensionbarometer, a monthly Dutch longitudinal
household survey of pension policy expectations, and a dataset containing
the weekly frequency of newspaper articles on old age social security taken
from the LexisNexis database. Naturally, I do not know how many and what
newspaper articles individuals read or take notice of when determining ex-
pectations. However, I do observe multiple survey periods before which
hardly any relevant newspaper articles appeared. The observed expectation
changes in these surveys are likely to be realizations of the heterogeneous
reporting error term which allows me to estimate the value of the reporting
error variance per subsample. The Publicity Reaction Coe±cient is then es-
timated by subtracting this error variance from the variance of expectation
changes in high-publicity periods.
It turns out that media coverage of the old age social security system
typically accounts for between zero and thirty percent of the variance in
expectation changes. Rather than publicity, random shifts thus explain the
majority of the variance in changes in eligibility age expectations, with es-
pecially older individuals being more imprecise in their expectation reports.
When comparing subgroups, I ¯nd that middle-aged, those who infrequently
read a newspaper, those who consider themselves below-average informed
about Dutch politics and those who read free or populist newspapers have a
relatively high PRC. These respondents thus change their expectations more
after heavy media attention than other demographic groups. On the con-
trary the old, those with a university degree and those who earn a relatively
high income have a low Publicity Reaction Coe±cient. These socio-economic
groups are thus relatively insensitive to heavy media attention on old age
social security. This could be counter-intuitive at ¯rst, but several plausi-
ble explanations can be identi¯ed. First, it becomes understandable when
the majority of newspaper articles about the old age social security system
contains `old news'. It is after all likely that those with lower quality initial
expectations adapt their expectations more whenever already available in-
formation is repeated in the media. The quality of the priors of those with a
university degree is probably better so that these respondents can ignore all
the information in the media that they were already aware of. If this is the
mechanism at play, policy-makers could thus improve the quality of expecta-
tions by often repeating already available information in the media. Second,
another explanation could be that those for whom the future of old age so-
cial security is more important pay more attention to the relevant media
exposure. As the old age social security bene¯t is universal in level, it plays
a minor role in the pension income of high income individuals. Hence, the
4high-income group probably does not read the relevant newspaper articles
as interestedly as middle-income individuals. The same holds for those over
the age of 64 as changes in the social security eligibility age will probably not
a®ect them anymore. If this is the mechanism at play, policy-makers could
probably not improve the quality of expectations by often repeating already
available information in the media, as those who want to know already pay
attention to the available publicity. Additional research is needed to ¯nd out
more about the mechanisms that drive the di®erences in publicity reaction
between demographic groups.
This paper will proceed with an overview of some of the relevant eco-
nomic literature in Section 2. I then propose an econometric approach to
estimate the Publicity Reaction Coe±cient in Section 3. Furthermore, I
describe the Pensionbarometer dataset (Section 4) and the information set
that was available to respondents during the observation window (Section 5).
Section 6 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
In this section I will present some of the relevant economic literature on
expectations formation and the role that publicity could play in this pro-
cess. As the contribution of this paper is the empirical analysis of a unique
expectations dataset I am however not exhaustive here. Interesting parallels
with the subjective health expectations literature and asset pricing litera-
ture could be drawn, but were omitted in order to be as concise as possible.
Before data on subjective expectations were available, economists al-
ready formulated models for expectations formation in order to complete
their theoretical and structural models. Especially in monetary economics
it is of the utmost importance how expectations formation is modeled. Most
of these expectations formation theories have one thing in common; they link
the relevant information that is available at time t to what organizations,
¯rms and individuals expect to happen at time t + 1. Among the ¯rst
to formalize a theory on expectations formation were Arrow and Nerlove
(1958) who expanded the adaptive expectations theory in which one learns
from previous prediction errors. Another well-known example of such a the-
ory is the rational expectations hypothesis proposed by Muth (1961). He
introduced the convenient notion that individuals and ¯rms use all the cur-
rently available information in a correct way so that they compute perfect,
or unbiased, expectations. Given the evidence of judgement biases in simple
evaluation tasks (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), the rational expecta-
tions assumption is unlikely to hold in reality. Several authors have indeed
shown that not all relevant and available information is incorporated in ex-
pectations (e.g. Figlewski and Wachtel, 1981, and Carroll, 2003) and that
changes in expectations are typically more extreme than ex-post justi¯ed
(e.g. De Bondt and Thaler (1990)). Given that most of these studies ana-
5lyze in°ation or exchange rate expectations of professional forecasters, the
extent to which expectations of the general public are biased is probably
even larger.
Out of discontent with the standard rational expectations assumption,
Mankiw and Reis (2002) introduced a more realistic theory: the sticky ex-
pectations model. In this expectations formation model all new information
is correctly absorbed in the expectations of a certain fraction of the popula-
tion, while another - ignorant - fraction sticks to their previous expectations.
Although a vast improvement to the earlier literature on expectations for-
mation, the sticky expectations literature does not discuss which individuals
belong to the updating and which belong to the ignorant group. In fact, the
theory assumes that each period all individuals are equally likely to update
their expectations. It seems more reasonable though that certain individ-
uals are always on top of the news and hence display a strong information
reaction, while others systematically ignore the news and hence have more
stable expectations.
Some authors have tested the sticky-expectations model by quantifying
the fraction of the population that belongs to the ignorant group, typically
analyzing ex-post prediction errors in in°ation expectations. Mankiw, Reis
and Wolfers (2003) estimate that professional economists in the Livingstone
survey update their expectations once every ten months and that house-
holds in the Michigan Survey update their in°ation expectations once every
thirteen months. This comes down to more than ninety percent of individ-
uals ignoring new information revelations each month. Carroll (2003) ¯nds
that the typical household in the Michigan Survey updates in°ation expec-
tations roughly once a year, while unemployment expectations appear to be
updated more frequently.
Carroll also pays attention to media intensity on the relevant random
variable. He uses the Michigan Survey to ¯nd that in°ation expectations
are more accurate in periods before which there is a lot of news coverage on
in°ation and also that the updating speed in the total population is faster
when there has been more news coverage. In his paper, Carroll provides a
micro-foundation for Mankiw and Reis's sticky expectations, as he proposes
that the media are the information channel through which individuals, in
di®erent degrees, absorb professional forecasters' in°ation expectations. An-
other example of a study in which publicity plays a direct role is a paper by
Lamla and Lein (2008) who examined the role of the media in German con-
sumers' in°ation expectations. Their ¯ndings support Carolls results that
more news indeed leads to more expectations updating. Lamla and Lein
also investigate the e®ect of the wording of in°ation news and ¯nd that the
expectation bias increased in periods in which the media were blaming the
introduction of the euro for signi¯cant price increases. Although they do
show that media intensity a®ects the quality of expectations, neither Car-
roll nor Lamla and Lein address if and how demographic groups di®er in
6their uptake of relevant information in the media.
While ignoring the publicity element of expectations formation, other
authors have examined demographic di®erences in expectations. Several
papers have analyzed the di®erences in ex-post expectation errors between
professional forecasters, or economists, on the one hand and households on
the other hand (e.g. Gramlich, 1983). Unexpectedly, this comparison does
not always favor the professionals. Gramlich also provides sketchy evidence
that low-income and low-education households forecast in°ation better. He
argues that this counterintuitive ¯nding has its origin in the accelerating
in°ation during the survey period 1978-1979. Congenital pessimists, which
he believes low-income and low-educated individuals are, would have had a
forecast advantage in that period. Jonung (1981) was one of the ¯rst to de-
compose household in°ation perceptions and expectations demographically
and he found that women perceived higher in°ation rates than men using
Swedish data. Jonung suggests that this might have to do with the di®erent
products that men and women buy, as especially food in°ation had been
relatively high in the survey period. This importance of private information
sets in in°ation expectations has been a major argument to analyze policy
change expectations in this paper. Souleles (2004) related macro-economic
forecast errors to demographic characteristics and he found that the forecast
bias decreased in magnitude with age, income and education. He however
does not provide an explanation for this phenomenon.
The sticky-expectations model is thus a promising recent development
in the theoretical expectations formation literature that is more realistic
than its predecessors. So far, empirical tests of the model suggests that
many individuals indeed choose to ignore publicly available information. It
now seems policy relevant to shed more light on the heterogeneity in the
stickiness of expectations. In this paper I focus on how the updating of ex-
pectations di®ers over various demographic and media consumption groups.
This empirical exercise can only be done using an expectation for which
private information is unimportant, as this will circumvent many identi¯ca-
tion issues. In Section 4 I will explain that the expectations regarding the
future of the Dutch old age social security eligibility age are perfect for this
purpose.
3 Expectations formation model
3.1 A theoretical model of the information reaction
I consider the following expectations formation model that makes only weak
assumptions on the relationship between information, publicity and expec-
tations. Individual i reports expectations at time t over the realization of
a random variable y at a speci¯ed moment in the future, t + z. This ex-
pectation will be denoted as ~ yt+z
it and is the sum of three components: a
7function fi of the absorbed information set that is available at time t, ­it, a
time-invariant component, Ài, and a reporting error term, ²it. The following
equation presents this expectations formation model:
~ yt+z
it = fi(­it) + Ài + ²it:
Individual heterogeneity enters the expectations formation formula in
many ways. First, individuals do not necessarily absorb all available infor-
mation. This means that the personal information set ­it is a subset of
the generally available information set ­t (­it µ ­t). Note that this means
that private information is excluded in this expectations formation model;
individuals di®er in their information absorption but they could in principle
all access the same knowledge.
A second source of individual heterogeneity resides in how the absorbed
information is translated into an expectation. The information processing
function fi(¢) in the expectations formation model therefore has subscript
i. Information absorption and information processing are theoretically dif-
ferent concepts - think about the proverb `In one ear::: Out the other'.
Unfortunately, it is empirically very di±cult to distinguish the two e®ects.
Therefore, I will from now on refer to their combined e®ect on expectations
as the information consumption e®ect.
The expectations formation model includes two additional sources of in-
terpersonal variation. The constant component Ài represents individuals' in-
herent inclination towards low or high expectations, i.e. towards pessimism
or optimism. Moreover, I make assumptions on the distribution of the error
term ²it that allow for individual heteroskedasticity. All assumptions on the
error term can be summarized as follows:
²it » n:i:d:(0;¾2
i ):
The larger the variance of the error term, ¾2
i , the larger is the typical
deviation in the expectations report from the information-based expecta-
tion. In this model, individuals thus di®er in the size of these deviations.
A way of thinking about this is that someone with a small error variance
is a precise individual and someone with a high error variance is a sloppy
individual.
One source of heterogeneity in the expectations, namely the individual-
speci¯c constant term Ài, can easily be eliminated by taking ¯rst di®erences.
It is important to note that in empirical applications this individual constant
term will, besides optimism, also include the in°uence of initial information
on expectations. This is because the expectations formation process will
have started (long) before the expectations are ¯rst observed by the re-
searcher. The ¯rst di®erence expectations formation model can be found
8below:
~ yt+z
it ¡ ~ yt+z
i;t¡1 = fi(­it) ¡ fi(­i;t¡1) + ²it ¡ ²i;t¡1 )
¢it~ yt+z = ¢itfi(­) + ¢it²:
Expectation changes are thus a linear combination of the change in the
processed information set that an individual absorbs into her expectations
(¢itfi(­)) and a new error component (¢it²). The new errors are by as-
sumption independent normal with mean zero and a variance that is twice
the individual error variance ¾2
i .
The systematic e®ect of information on expectation changes (¢itfi(­))
is what I call the information reaction. In this paper, I am interested in the
size of this e®ect and especially in how this size varies over individuals.
3.2 Information, publicity and newspaper articles
Now that it is clear that expectation changes depend on the new information
that someone consumes in between two time periods, it is necessary to think
about how a person acquires her new expectation formation input. Public
information dissemination, or publicity, is likely to play an important part
in this information acquisition.
The publicity set, £t, is de¯ned here as the set of all information on
the realization of the random variable y at time t + z that is disseminated
through publicly available media outlets between period t ¡ 1 and period
t. These outlets would include television programmes, internet blogs and
magazine and newspaper articles. The publicity set, £t, can be divided in
two separate subsets: the set of truly new information revelations that were
unavailable last period, ¢t­, and the set of repeated information elements
that were already known last period, ©t. The exact explanation of the
publicity set is given in the following equations:
£t = ¢t­ [ ©t
¢t­ \ ©t = ;
¢t­ * ­t¡1
©t µ ­t¡1:
Note that the publicity set is de¯ned such that each informational element
can only enter the set once, so that the number of times that a certain piece
of information is mentioned in the media does not play a role in £t.
I will assume that the only sources from which individuals derive new
information, ¢it­, are the public media outlets. I thus exclude library visits
and say, university lectures. Note that one does not have to watch a certain
television programme oneself to know what it was about. I am allowing for
hearing about news from others - colleagues, family, friends - as long as there
9is only a short period between the appearance of the television programme
and the informal information dissemination. I furthermore do not allow for
lagged publicity e®ects in my expectation change model. A person that
chooses not to read the newspaper in a certain period cannot decide to read
it three months later. This is not such a strong assumption as repetitions
of existent information (©t) are an important component of the publicity
set (£t). These two assumptions on the newly absorbed information are
summarized as follows:
¢it­ µ £t:
Unfortunately, there are two empirical problems concerning the publicity
set £t. First, as I am interested in quantifying the information reaction in
expectations, a quantitative measure of information dissemination is much
more useful than a set of informational elements. This is because each el-
ement of the information set will have a distinct in°uence on expectations
and these e®ects cannot be separated empirically. Second, it is technically
impossible to exactly observe all informational elements of the publicity set
£t. Even if a researcher would have time to carefully read the thousands of
relevant newspaper articles, there is no way to assemble all television pro-
grammes that have featured information on the random variable y. Because
of these data problems, I will introduce a new quantitative and observable
measure of publicity intensity, µt, which I de¯ne as the number of newspa-
per articles that mention the relevant random variable y in their content
(in this paper, the old age social security eligibility age). Newspapers are
naturally not the only available media outlet. However, I choose to restrict
µt to newspaper articles as this is the only information source that can easily
be retrieved. The underlying assumption is that the correlation between the
publicity intensity across all media outlets is very strong.
A positive relationship between the number of elements in the public-
ity set £t and the quantitative measure of publicity intensity µt is easy to
imagine. It is likely that the more newspaper articles appear about a certain
subject, the more information about that topic will be disseminated. How
strong this relationship is from period to period is hard to say however. One
frontpage article by a well-known journalist could have much more in°uence
than a standard press release that has been copied in all large newspapers.
I therefore choose not to further formalize the relationship between the con-
tent and quantity of media coverage. The only assumption that I am willing
to make is that the publicity set £t is empty when the amount of newspaper
articles on the relevant variable y is very low, i.e. when µt ¼ 0. What I
mean with very low will become explicit in Section 5 of this paper.
It turns out that the restrictions on no lagged publicity and on the re-
lationship between £t and µt are very useful assumptions. Together they
imply that the information-related component of expectation changes - i.e.
the information reaction - will equal zero when the media intensity on the
10random variable is very low. The information reaction in such circumstances
is laid out in the equation below:
¢itfi(­) = 0 if £t = ; , i.e. when µt ¼ 0:
Because this proposition requires important assumptions on how individ-
uals obtain their personal information set from the media, it is appropriate
to name the information related component of expectation changes the pub-
licity reaction here rather than the information reaction. Although the two
are the same by assumption I believe that readers could misunderstand the
information e®ect as having to do with real information revelations only
(¢t­) rather than also with repeated elements of the information set (©t).
Note that a lack of publicity is not the only circumstance as a result of
which a zero publicity reaction is observed. The publicity reaction could
also be zero when 1) the individual does not absorb any new publicity, 2)
all elements of the consumed publicity set were already known to the indi-
vidual or 3) the individual does not change her expectation after processing
the newly absorbed information.
3.3 Identi¯cation of the publicity reaction
The proposition that the informed component of an expectation does not
change whenever the publicity on the realization of the relevant variable has
been negligible will prove useful in identifying the actual publicity reaction
later on. To see this, let me ¯rst de¯ne two types of time periods: the
set L contains periods in which there is hardly any publicity between t ¡ 1
and t (t 2 L if µt ¼ 0) and the set H contains periods before which some
publicity, containing real and/or repeated news, is published (t 2 H if µt À




¢it² if t 2 L
¢itfi(­) + ¢it² if t 2 H:
It turns out that in low-publicity periods expectation changes are only a
realization of the change error, while in high-publicity periods the publicity
reaction enters the expression as well. In order for this distinction between
L and H to be empirically relevant I need to observe expectation changes
in time periods in which the quantity of relevant newspaper articles is low
(µt ¼ 0) and in periods in which it is high (µt À 0). I will explain in Section
5 that I indeed observe such periods for my social security policy expecta-
tions.
I cannot derive interesting empirical results from the expectations change
model in terms of the level of changes. This is because both increases and
decreases in expectations could be due to publicity reactions but such ob-
servations would cancel out in estimations. Instead, I am interested in the
11variance of expectation changes which, under assumptions, can give me in-
sight into the degree to which expectations are formed by publicity con-
sumption. The traditional variance measure is the second central moment,
i.e. the extent to which di®erent observations of a variable typically vary
from its mean (E[(~ yt+z
it ¡ ~ y)2]). For the publicity reaction analysis I am
however interested in the second moment (E[(~ yt+z
it )2]) rather than in the
second central moment as changes in expectations and not levels are the
unit of analysis. Think about an individual that increased her expectation
by the same (large) amount for a couple of time periods in a row. The sec-
ond central moment of this person's expectation changes would equal zero,
although it is very well possible that the individual did (strongly) react to
publicity. The second moment of her expectation changes will have been
relatively large however. In this paper, the word variance will thus repre-
sent the second moment of expectation changes, i.e. the average squared
expectation changes. This is a very intuitive unit of analysis, as it will al-
ways increase in the degree of publicity reaction.
The data at hand does have to satisfy one non-testable assumption in
order for the variance to be a suitable unit of analysis. I have to assume
that there is no linear relationship between the publicity reaction and the
new error term i.e. the covariance between these elements of expectation
changes should equal zero:
E[¢itfi(­) ¤ ¢it²] = Cov(¢itfi(­);¢it²) = 0:
The zero correlation assumption is necessary for the variance of the ex-
pectation changes to be the sum of the variance of its components. Note
that this relatively weak assumption does not rule out heteroscedasticity. It
remains possible for the variance of the change errors (2¾2
i ) to be a func-
tion of individual time-invariant characteristics. If the covariance is indeed
zero, the variance of the expectation changes can be decomposed as in the
following equation:




V ar(¢it²) = E[(¢it²)2] if t 2 L
V ar(¢itfi(­) + ¢it²)
= E[((¢itfi(­))2] + E[(¢it²)2] if t 2 H:
The periods with very little publicity on the variable that individuals
have expectations over (L) can now be exploited to identify the proportion
of the variance in expectation changes related to publicity. A two-step pro-
cedure has to be applied. First, I can estimate the variance of the error
component in expectation changes by computing the average squared ex-
pectation change in the low-publicity periods. Second, I can decompose the
total variance in publicity-rich periods (H) into the variance of the public-
ity reaction and the variance of the error term which is estimated in the
12¯rst step. This can be done as I assume that the variance of the report-
ing error term is constant over time, so that the variance of the error term
in low-publicity times will be similar to that in high-publicity times. This
procedure then generates an estimate of the proportion of the variance in
expectation changes that is related to information dissemination:
\ V ar(¢it²) = E[(¢i;tL~ yt+z)2]
\ V ar(¢itfi(­)) = V ar(¢i;tH ~ yt+z) ¡ \ V ar(¢it²) )
= E[(¢i;tH ~ yt+z)2] ¡ E[(¢i;tL~ yt+z)2]:
When an estimate of the variance of the publicity reaction exists, I can
say something on the importance of publicity in the expectations formation
process relative to the importance of noise. I can calculate the Publicity
Reaction Coe±cient (PRC), which is de¯ned as the ratio of the estimated
systematic variance over the total variance of expectation changes. The
higher the PRC, the more important is the role of information dissemination






E[(¢i;tH ~ yt+z)2] ¡ E[(¢i;tL~ yt+z)2]
E[(¢i;tH ~ yt+z)2]
(1)
The Publicity Reaction Coe±cient is ideally estimated on the individual
level. This can be done when su±cient observations are available on the in-
dividual level in both publicity-poor and publicity-rich periods. Especially
the number of low-publicity observations is important because these are used
to estimate the variance of the new error term which should be consistently
estimated. One can imagine that at least 30 expectations observations in
low-publicity periods would be necessary to do so. Unfortunately the dataset
that I will be using is not long enough to meet this criterium. Therefore
the reporting error variance and consequently the PRC will be estimated
for di®erent demographic and media consumption subgroups rather than
per individual. The subscript i in this section should for my empirical ap-
plication thus be interpreted as representing di®erent groups rather than
persons. The estimated group-PRC's will still be very relevant as these will
allow me to draw conclusions on how the publicity reaction in expectations
di®ers across relevant groups in the population. It seems policy relevant
to know whose expectations (over)react to publicity and who displays large
reporting errors. If such groups could be identi¯ed, information campaigns
could for example be better targeted.
3.4 The prediction error variance estimated
Under the assumption of normality of the reporting error term it is further-
more possible to see how the noise variance ¾2
i is related to demographics.
13Although this is not central to the publicity reaction analysis, it is nev-
ertheless interesting to see which groups are more prone to errors in their
expectation estimates. I choose to model the heteroscedasticity in the vari-
ance of ¢it² in the multiplicative fashion that is often used. Like in the
textbook examples, I thus work with the assumption that the individual
variance equals an exponential function. The squared expectation changes
in periods before which no publicity entered the scene (t 2 L) can then be
seen as drawings from the variance distribution. If I moreover take logs
on both sides, the model simpli¯es to a linear equation which can be es-
timated using OLS. These steps are laid out in the equations below. The
°-coe±cients will tell me who is more precise and who is more sloppy by
nature:
\ V ar(¢it²) = E[(¢i;tL~ yt+z)2]
(¢i;tL~ yt+z)2 = 2 ¤ ¾2
i = 2 ¤ e(®+x
0
i°+´it)






Although this paper wishes to say something about the publicity reaction
in general, the expectations that will be empirically examined are people's
beliefs over the future of the Dutch old age social security eligibility age.
This subjective expectation is interesting and useful in the publicity reac-
tion analysis for the following four reasons. First, as the Dutch old age
social security system (the `AOW') is completely universal, i.e. all individu-
als receive a similar level of bene¯ts from the same age onwards irrespective
of contributions paid, all forecasts about potential policy changes refer to
the same random variable. The expectations are therefore fully comparable.
Second, the majority of individuals expects to grow old and therefore to
receive the non-negligible4 `AOW' bene¯ts at some point in time. Hence,
the future of the old age social security system is of direct consequence to
respondents, thereby enhancing the quality of answers provided. Third, as
the future of the old age social security system basically depends on a few
individuals only (i.e. on 150 members of parliament) and as the debate
about its sustainability is followed closely by the media, I claim that all the
information that could enter the formation process of eligibility age expec-
tations is publicly available. This implies that di®erences in expectations
4In 2008 the `AOW' bene¯t was equal to gross e997,12 for a single individual and
e682,51 for a cohabitating individual. Note that gross would almost have been equal to
net in this case.
14only re°ect di®erences in which pieces of information individuals absorb and
on how this information is processed, not on which information individuals
actually have access to.
The expectations data analyzed in this paper is taken from a Dutch sur-
vey on pensions' opinions and expectations, the Pensionbarometer, which is
collected by CentERdata at Tilburg University in the Netherlands. Netspar,
a Dutch research network on pensions, ageing and retirement, has funded
the data collection process. The Pensionbarometer is collected mainly to
produce longitudinal statistics for con¯dence-levels in the Dutch pension
system. Every month about 500 individuals are asked to answer a few gen-
eral questions about social security, pensions and retirement via the internet.
The respondents are randomly selected from the CentERdata internetpanel,
which in turn is a random sample of the population drawn from the mu-
nicipal registry. Whenever a selected individual does not have access to
the internet, CentERdata makes sure that access is arranged. The Pension-
barometer is designed as a panel-type survey, and every respondent receives
the questionnaire every three months so that there are in total three re-
curring groups of respondents. This was done to be able to produce the
con¯dence statistics monthly while not overwhelming the respondents with
questions. In this paper, I use the ¯rst thirty-one waves of the Pensionbarom-
eter (16,669 observations). The ¯rst wave of the survey was enumerated in
May, 2006. The last wave that is included in my analysis was enumerated in
November, 2008. A total of 2,573 individuals were interviewed. Individuals
participated eight times on average. 296 individuals reply only once (there is
replacement sampling) and 707 individuals answer the probability questions
ten or more times.
The Pensionbarometer asks a series of four questions about individuals'
eligibility age expectations that read as follows:
\What is the probability (between 0 and 100) that within ten
years/ within twenty years the `AOW'-eligibility age will be ...
- higher?
- higher by at least two years?
- lower?
- lower by at least two years?"
The questions were always asked in the order above. Four rather then one
questions were posed to provide insight in the internal consistency and un-
derlying distribution of the expectations. For longitudinal studies it is how-
ever more interesting to examine each question separately as this allows me
to focus on changes in expectations. Although the total sample PRCs in the
other probabilities will also be reported, I therefore estimate the subgroup
Publicity Reaction Coe±cients using the ¯rst question on a higher eligibility
age.
Each Pensionbarometer survey, the time horizon for which an individual
15is asked her expectations is randomly chosen and this time horizon thus
varies over the surveys for each individual. The questions either concern a
ten or a twenty years time horizon. As I believe there is no clear, cardi-
nal relationship between the ten and twenty year expectations I will report
the results for both horizons separately. This leaves me with a ¯rst sample
of expectation levels with 8,521 ten year observations (2,339 individuals)
and 8,148 twenty year observations (2,322 individuals). A second sample of
expectation changes is smaller for two reasons. First, the initial Pension-
barometer wave drops out when changes are considered. Second, consecutive
expectation answers over di®erent time horizons - when for example ¯rst ten
year expectations are given and later twenty year expectations - are also ig-
nored. A change in expectations could in such a case namely also re°ect
a di®erent opinion on the time horizons rather than it being a result of a
publicity reaction. I lose 4,646 ¯rst wave observations and another 6,716
observations because the time horizon that the individual was asked to pro-
vide an expectation over changes from one survey to the next. This leaves
me with a second sample of 2,736 ten year expectation changes (1,296 indi-
viduals) and 2,571 twenty year expectation changes (1,283 individuals).
The Pensionbarometer also enumerates several important demographic
characteristics such as education level, age and income. The Publicity Re-
action Coe±cient of all relevant subgroups will be estimated in Section 6.
Three independent variables concern media consumption, which will be in-
teresting when analyzing the publicity reaction. The media consumption
data is based on additional questions that were asked to all respondents in
June 2008. Unfortunately, this means the media information is not available
for all respondents, but only for 987 of them. Two questions about direct
media consumption read:
\How often do you read a newspaper (free papers and internet
papers included)?"
and
\How often do you watch a regular news bulletin on the televi-
sion?"
The response scales individuals could use were 1) Every day, 2) Multiple
times a week, 3) Once a week, 4) At least once a month, 5) Less than once
a month. The distribution of answers over these scales can be found in Ta-
ble 1. The Pensionbarometer sample is relatively well-read and frequently
watches news bulletins on television. More than sixty percent of respon-
dents state that they read the newspaper on a daily basis. It should be
noted that newspaper take-up is generally high in The Netherlands. The
Dutch Bureau of Statistics reports that in 2006 51 % of the population had
a paid newspaper subscription. For the empirical analysis of this paper I
16Table 1: Frequencies of informative media consumption - in terms of news-
paper and television bulletins - for respondents in second sample.
Newspaper Television news
Every day 66% 61%
Multiple times a week 18% 30%
Once a week 7% 5%
At least once a month 2% 2%
Less than once a month 6% 3%
Observations 987 987
Table 2: Response frequency for which newspaper the respondents most
read in second sample.
Most read
Free newspapers 12%
`De Telegraaf' (populist) 11%
`De Volkskrant' (progressive) 10%
`NRC Handelsblad' (liberal) 7%
Other 60%
Observations 926
have transformed the consumption data in two dummies for relatively low
media consumption: low newspaper consumption (once a week or less) and
low television news consumption (once a week or less). This was done be-
cause the latter categories contain relatively little observations. I performed
sensitivity analysis for the results in Section 6 using a di®erent threshold for
the dummy which had little e®ects on the results.
I also know which newspaper the respondents most often read, as they
were asked to state from which newspaper they typically obtained most
information. The frequencies can be found in table 2. The most read cat-
egory are the free newspapers which are distributed in and around public
transport and in communal buildings such as Metro, `Spits' and `De Pers'.
12% of respondents indicate that they obtain most information from these
sources. Other large categories are two morning quality newspapers, one
more conservative/ populist - `De Telegraaf' and another more progressive
- `De Volkskrant'5. It will be interesting to see whether the slant of a news-
paper a®ects how individuals absorb publicity into their expectations in the
empirical section.
Additionally, respondents were asked to rate their own knowledge of
5The classi¯cation of newspapers according to their tone or background is taken from
a newspaper article in the `NRC Next' on the 4th of March 2009.
17Table 3: Response frequency for subjective political informedness for re-








current political events. The exact question posed read:
\Compared to the average Dutch person, how well informed are
you about current a®airs in Dutch politics?"
Respondents could choose from ¯ve answer categories: 1) Very bad, 2) Bad,
3) Average, 4) Well, 5) Very well. Table 3 shows that the Pensionbarome-
ter respondents consider themselves relatively well-informed, although still
sixteen percent believe that they know less than the average Dutchmen. In
Section 6 I translate this data into a dummy for being relatively ill-informed
(very bad and bad answer categories). This partition was chosen as it best
explains the di®erences in empirical publicity reactions.
4.2 Characteristics of the expectations formation process
In this section I present some noticeable facts of the expectations formation
process that are observed in the data. Whenever statistics on the expecta-
tion levels are reported I have used the ¯rst sample (N=16,669), whereas I
am using the second sample (N=5,307) whenever statistics on expectation
changes are discussed.
Figure 1 sheds some light on the development of the average subjec-
tive expectations over all waves and both time horizons. Each data-point
represents the mean of about 250 observations. The observed average prob-
ability of later bene¯ts is well above 50 (i.e. a probability of one half) for
all waves and both time horizons. Hence, pessimism prevails. The average
does vary over the relevant time horizon. As one would expect, people be-
lieve that the probability of a policy change within the next twenty years is
higher (average is 65) than within the next ten years (average is 61). This
di®erence was consistent in all but one waves. The Pensionbarometer re-
spondents were most optimistic around the end of 2006/ beginning of 2007
(when a new government was being formed) and most pessimistic around
the summer of 2008 (when a government appointed committee proposed to
raise the eligibility age to 67 years). The average probability seems con-
siderably volatile; the di®erence between the smallest and largest average
18Figure 1: Average probability assigned to higher eligibility age for both time
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probability is about 15 probability points for both the ten and the twenty
year expectations. Note that I choose to name high probabilities pessimistic
here and low probabilities optimistic out of convenience; this does not mean
to say that I have an objective rationale to label the high or low answers
normatively.
A histogram in Figure A-1 in the appendix provides more information
on the distribution of the twenty year answers. A clustering of probabilities
around 50 is visible. It has been argued that respondents also provide a
¯fty percent chance response when they have no idea what probability to
assign. Manski (2004) however argues that \This concern has largely been
laid to rest as empirical evidence has accumulated." (p. 1342). Also given
that only one percent of respondents always answer 50 to both the ten and
twenty year horizon questions I will assume here that all 50 answers repre-
sent true opinions.
Although in general respondents are pessimistic about the future of the
old age social security eligibility age, considerable heterogeneity in expecta-
tions exists. Figure A-2 in the appendix represents the median and the 25th
and 75th percentile for the expectations with a twenty year time horizon.
The average interquartile range is substantial and relatively constant over
time, at about 40 probability points.
19This individual heterogeneity in the assessment of future policy changes
is to a certain degree persistent. Those individuals who assign a higher (or
lower) than average probability in one period are more likely to do so in the
next period. Using the second sample, I ¯nd that the probability of assign-
ing a higher than average probability to a policy change in two consecutive
periods is equal to 74 % for the ten year expectations and 67 % for the
twenty-year expectations. The probability of assigning a lower than average
probability twice in a row is 77 % for the ten year expectations and 77 % for
the twenty year expectations. This means that despite the general tendency
to remain less or more optimistic than others, still more than twenty percent
of individuals move their expectation to the other side of the distribution
from one period to the next.
The vast majority of individuals, also those who remain on one side of
Figure 2: Percentage of respondents adapting eligibility age expectations
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the average expectation, alter their stated expectations between consecutive
surveys. Figure 2 shows the percentages of respondents that change their
subjective probabilities by more than ¯ve points compared to their previ-
ous answer. Absolute changes below ¯ve probability points are ignored as
these could just be due to rounding di®erences. Remember that my sec-
ond sample only includes observations of individuals who happened to have
20answered questions for a similar time horizon in two adjacent surveys and
that expectation changes are thus measured over a three month period. The
average percentage of respondents that display a positive change equals 34%
and the average percentage of respondents that display a negative change
over all waves equals 32%. About seventy percent of individuals thus signif-
icantly update their beliefs within three months. Moreover, only six percent
of respondents never change their expectations by more than ¯ve probability
points.
Table 4 ¯nally displays the regression results of two-limit Tobit regres-
sions of the subjective probability of a higher eligibility age on some relevant
demographic characteristics for both the ten and the twenty year expecta-
tions. A tobit estimation technique was chosen to accommodate censoring
of the given probabilities at 0 and 100. In both time horizon regressions,
the older one gets, the more optimistic one becomes. Also persistent in
both columns; respondents with relatively higher incomes as well as those
with a partner are signi¯cantly more pessimistic. Gender furthermore in-
°uences the short-term social security expectations. Women assign higher
probabilities to an increase in the eligibility age within ten years. Education
moreover has a signi¯cant in°uence on the long-term eligibility age proba-
bilities. Those who completed a higher vocational or an academic education
are signi¯cantly more pessimistic about the future. Despite the signi¯cant
covariates, individual heterogeneity and noise seems to be most important
in explaining di®erences in expectation levels as the regressions only explain
about 0.4 % of the variation in expectations.
21Table 4: Coe±cients and standard errors of two-limit Tobit regressions.
Dependent: probability of higher eligibility age between 0 and 100.
(1) (2)
10 years 20 years
Coef. S.e. Coef. S.e.
Vocational secondary -4.638¤ (1.90) -1.341 (2.940)
General secondary -1.317 (2.11) 3.845 (3.124)
Vocational tertiary 0.052 (2.01) 1.430 (3.016)
Higher vocational 1.803 (1.98) 4.921¤ (2.950)
Academic education 1.865 (2.21) 7.709¤¤¤ (3.158)
Age 15-24 -7.106 (35.84) -0.163 (1.865)
Age 35-44 -6.414¤¤¤ (1.42) -6.305¤¤¤ (1.631)
Age 45-54 -8.283¤¤¤ (1.36) -5.281¤¤ (1.616)
Age 55-64 -11.889¤¤¤ (1.38) -8.880¤¤¤ (1.721)
Age >64 -14.394¤¤¤ (1.40) -14.086¤¤¤ (1.761)
Low middle income 1.954 (1.31) 0.385 (1.753)
Middle income 5.828¤¤¤ (1.42) 4.968¤¤¤ (1.872)
High middle income 5.350¤¤¤ (1.48) 4.895¤¤ (1.965)
High income 6.049¤¤¤ (1.62) 5.824¤¤¤ (2.094)
Dummy female 2.570¤¤ (0.99) 0.316 (1.307)
Dummy partner 6.318¤¤¤ (0.99) 6.476¤¤¤ (1.296)
Observations 8,450 8,087
Individuals 2,317 2,290
Censored at 0 288 231
Censored at 100 1,285 1491
Pseudo R2 0.40% 0.42%
Standard errors in parentheses
¤ p < 0:05,
¤¤ p < 0:01,
¤¤¤ p < 0:001
Base categories: primary education, age 25-34, low income
225 Publicity set
The publicity set £t is de¯ned in Section 3 as the set of all informational
elements on the realization of the relevant entity (here the old age social
security eligibility age) that is disseminated through publicly available me-
dia outlets between two survey periods. These outlets include for example
television programmes, internet blogs and magazine and newspaper articles.
As explained before, the publicity set contains both new informational ele-
ments, ¢t­, and repetitions of already available information, ©t. Because
it is empirically very di±cult to identify the exact elements in and the pre-
cise size of the publicity set, Section 3 already introduced the quantity of
newspaper articles, µt, as a reasonable proxy for the intensity of publicity
in a given period. Carroll (2003) and Lamla and Lein (2008) also use the
number of newspaper articles in their papers. In the theoretical section it is
explained that on the relationship between the publicity set and the number
of published newspaper articles the only necessary assumption to estimate
the Publicity Reaction Coe±cient is that no information is disseminated
whenever the number of relevant newspaper articles has been very low.
The data on the quantity of newspaper articles is assembled through an
online database of written Dutch media content, LexisNexis. Every piece of
text that is published in large magazines and newspapers can be retrieved
through this database. For each week between the ¯rst wave of the Pen-
sionbarometer (week 19 in 2006) and the last reported wave (week 46 in
2008) I have selected all relevant articles that appeared in Dutch national
newspapers. Four di®erent series of weekly quantities were generated that
could partly overlap: the number of articles containing the acronym `AOW'
in their title, the number of articles containing the acronym `AOW' in their
introduction, the number of articles containing the word `AOW (eligibility)
age' in their total content and the number of articles containing the word
`ageing' in their introduction. Note that `AOW' is the acronym of the Dutch
equivalent of old age social security. Figure 3 displays these four series sepa-
rately. Considerable variation in the number of relevant newspaper articles
can be seen, with especially the middle time period low in media attention
for all four series.
Some peaks in the publicity quantities have a real information cause
and these events are indicated with vertical lines in Figure 3. Here is a
summary of important events related to old age social security during the
period May 2006 - November 2008: a) April 2006: The leader of the social-
democrats (Mr. W. Bos) gives a speech in which he promotes higher tax
rates for retired individuals. These rates had been lower because those over
64 do not pay old age social security contributions; b) August 2006: The
presentation of general election programs by all relevant parties. Most par-
ties, including the liberals and Christian-democrats, promise to keep the
old age social security scheme exactly as it is. Some small parties propose
23Figure 3: Weekly number of news paper articles in Dutch national media
featuring words relevant to the old age social security system and special
interest weeks (a-f) (week 1-52: 2006, week 53-104: 2007, week 105-157:
2008).
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to raise the eligibility age. The social-democrats stick to their idea to al-
ter the contributions scheme; c) November 2006: The election results come
in. Relatively to polls half-a-year earlier, the Christian-democrats win and
the social-democrats loose, mainly due to the unpopular social security con-
tributions policy proposal; d) February 2007: A coalition government of
Christian-democrats and social-democrats is formed and a compromise to
increase tax rates for rich retired individuals is revealed; e) June 2008: A
special government-appointed committee (`committee Bakker') of prominent
social- and Christian-democrats that was asked to think about labor force
participation in the long run proposes to e.g. increase the social security
eligibility age by two years from 65 to 67 years. The government o±cially
rejects this idea immediately; f) November 2008: Parliament accepts a new
taxation law that introduces marginally higher tax-rates for those over 64
and also a tax credit for those between 61 and 65 who are still employed.
Note that from this short description of events, it becomes clear that for
more than a year, between March 2007 and May 2008, the discussion about
the future of Dutch old age social security disappeared from the political
scene as other matters were more pressing (such as employment protection).
24This period will be very useful in identifying the variation in expectations
that can be attributed to noise.
The quantity of newspaper articles that matters for the publicity reac-
tion in expectations is actually the number of newspaper articles that have
appeared since the last time someone participated in the survey, as those
will be the potential inputs for changes in expectations. Remember that
although the Pensionbarometer is surveyed each month, a single respondent
only participates in it every third month. The relevant quantity here is thus
the cumulative number of newspaper articles that have been published over
these three months since the respondent last answered an expectation ques-
tion.
Figure 4: Cumulative newspaper articles three months before each survey,
relative to median per variable. Low publicity periods between dotted lines
(L). Very-high publicity periods between dashed lines (HH).
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To estimate the Publicity Reaction Coe±cient my survey span has to
include periods in which hardly any newspaper articles appeared ( µt ¼ 0).
I will now introduce two di®erent de¯nitions of low-publicity periods, based
on the four di®erent series in Figure 3. A period is quali¯ed as a standard
low-publicity period when the quantity of articles for all four publicity series
was below the median of that variable. The bar plots in Figure 4 show these
cumulative series per survey week in comparison to their respective medi-
ans. The publicity-low periods (L) are those in between the dotted lines. In
25Figure 5: Cumulative news paper articles three months before each survey,
relative to ¯rst quartile per variable. Very-low publicity periods between
dotted lines (LL). High publicity periods between dashed lines (H).
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total eight periods can be classi¯ed as information-low using this de¯nition.
In the same ¯gure, very-high publicity periods (HH) are identi¯ed as those
periods before which there was more than the median level of publicity in
all four series. The dataset contains seven of these periods. Table A-1 in
the appendix provides a list of all periods and their categories.
For the purpose of sensitivity analysis in Section 6 a second de¯nition
of publicity-poor periods is introduced, based on the ¯rst quartile of the
article quantities rather than on the median. Figure 5 shows the cumulative
number of articles compared to their respective ¯rst quartiles. A period is
quali¯ed as a very-low publicity period (LL) when the quantity of articles
for all four publicity series was below the ¯rst quartile of that variable. The
very-low publicity periods are those in between the dotted lines in Figure
5. Only three periods can be classi¯ed as information-low using this de¯ni-
tion. In the same ¯gure, high publicity periods (H) are identi¯ed as those
periods before which - for all four series - more newspaper articles appeared
than their respective ¯rst quartile. There are thirteen of such high-publicity
periods.
266 Empirical results
6.1 Reduced form analysis
This subsection presents reduced-form results of the extent to which the
variance of expectation changes and publicity intensity are related. This
is done to investigate whether more publicity before a survey indeed leads
to larger changes in expectations. Table 5 presents the results of OLS re-
gressions of the logarithm of squared changes in the higher eligibility age
expectations on publicity intensity and several other covariates that control
for individuals' propensity to change their expectations. In table 5 each
newspaper articles-coe±cient was estimated in a separate model, on both
the entire sample (column I) or the ten years (column II) and twenty years
horizon (column III) subsamples.
The results suggest that higher publicity levels are signi¯cantly associ-
Table 5: Selected coe±cients and standard errors of separate OLS models.
Dependent variable: logarithm of squared expectation changes in higher
eligibility age expectations. Newspaper article series in units of 100.
(I) (II) (III)
All Ten years Twenty years
Articles `AOW' 0.252* 0.255 0.232
in title (0.114) (0.155) (0.171)
Articles `AOW' 0.115* 0.124 0.099
in introduction (0.048) (0.067) (0.073)
Articles `AOW-age' 0.006 -0.054 0.064
in total content (0.093) (0.129) (0.141)
Articles `Ageing' 0.231** 0.227* 0.226
in introduction (0.076) (0.105) (0.113)
Observations 5,275 2,714 2,561
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
Other covariates: education level, age group, income group, gender and partner
ated with changes in eligibility age expectations. The e®ect is non-negligible.
One hundred additional newspaper articles that feature the Dutch acronym
for old age social security (`AOW') in their title increase changes in expec-
tations by 25 percent. Not only quantity but also the quality of news seems
to matter; newspaper articles mentioning `AOW' in their title have an ef-
fect on expectation changes that is more than twice as large as the e®ect of
those mentioning `AOW' in the introduction. An additional probit-analysis
of whether respondents changed their expectations (e.g. with at least 5
probability points) more often in periods of high publicity intensity showed
no signi¯cant publicity coe±cients. This indicates that the results in table
275 are driven by larger expectation changes rather than by more respondents
adapting their expectation answers.
6.2 Publicity Reaction Coe±cient
The underlying expectations formation model that explains the estimation
of the Publicity Reaction Coe±cient (PRC) is laid out in Section 3 and will
therefore not be repeated here. In this section I estimate the publicity reac-
tion in old age social security expectations using the Dutch Pensionbarom-
eter data. To obtain a ¯rst impression, Figure 6 depicts average squared
expectation changes per survey week for the two di®erent time horizons. As
in Figures 4 and 5, the periods between the dotted lines are classi¯ed as
low publicity periods (L) and the periods between the dashed lines as high
publicity periods (H). Although the extent to which respondents adapted
their expectations does seem somewhat lower in the information-poor peri-
ods the di®erence is not overwhelming. This indicates that random shifts in
expectation reports account for a substantial proportion of the variance in
expectation changes; something that will be supported by the PRC evidence
below.
Figure 6: Average squared change in probability assigned to later eligibility
age per survey week. Low publicity periods between dotted lines (L). High
publicity periods between dashed lines (H).
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Table 6 then presents the estimates of the Publicity Reaction Coe±cients
28for the total sample over the two di®erent time horizons and for the four
di®erent expectation questions. To remind the reader: the Publicity Reac-
tion Coe±cient is de¯ned as the ratio of the estimated systematic variance
over the total variance of expectation changes. The estimated systematic
variance equals the variance of expectation changes in high publicity peri-
ods (H) minus this variance in low publicity periods (L). The following
equation, a repetition of Equation 1 in Section 3, displays how the Publicity
Reaction Coe±cient is constructed.
PRC =
E[(¢i;tH ~ yt+z)2] ¡ E[(¢i;tL~ yt+z)2]
E[(¢i;tH ~ yt+z)2]
The PRCs in the ¯rst column are estimated exploiting expectation changes
in the high publicity and low publicity periods. To check the robustness
of these results, the PRC estimates in the second column only use observa-
tions in very-high and very-low publicity periods. How high and low and
very-high and very-low publicity periods are exactly de¯ned is explained in
Section 5. In Table A-2 in the appendix one ¯nds the number of obser-
vations used per estimate divided into those from publicity-poor and those
from publicity-rich periods. Throughout this section, PRC estimates are
depicted in normal text when the involved error variance estimate is based
on more than 50 observations. Italic text displays Publicity Reaction Coef-
¯cients that used error variance estimations based on in between 30 and 50
observations. Finally, a PRC is not displayed whenever less than 30 obser-
vations could be used to estimate the associated error variance.
All but three out of sixteen PRC estimates in Table 6 are positive,
Table 6: Publicity Reaction Coe±cients for the total expectation changes
sample
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Prob. for higher age 6.8% 1.8% 20.3%* -1.7%
(0.076) (0.090) (0.095) (0.134)
Prob. for two year 3.4% -2.2% 16.1%* -4.5%
higher age (0.077) (0.082) (0.095) (0.129)
Prob. for lower age 13.5% 19.5% 20.5% 9.0%
(0.164) (0.156) (0.211) (0.282)
Prob. for two year 10.9% 30.5%* 18.8% 26.4%
lower age (0.216) (0.160) (0.282) (0.256)
Standard errors are bootstrapped and in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
29indicating that expectations do change more in periods with a larger public-
ity set. The publicity reaction is typically larger when the considered time
horizon is shorter. Moreover, the probabilities that individuals assign to a
lower eligibility age are more sensitive to publicity than the probabilities
they assign to a higher eligibility age. For all subsamples however more
than seventy percent of the variance in expectation changes was due to ran-
dom shifts in expectations (as the highest signi¯cant PRC-estimate equals
30.5%). This is emphasized by the fact that only three PRCs are signi¯-
cantly di®erent from zero.
The following tables report Publicity Reaction Coe±cients that have
Table 7: PRCs for the probability of a higher eligibility age for ¯ve di®erent
age groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Age 25-34 42.0%* -9.0% 22.4% -73.7%
(0.162) (0.292) (0.335) (0.606)
Age 35-44 -24.9% -11.2% -9.6% -92.5%
(0.224) (0.319) (0.310) (0.812)
Age 45-54 15.6% 20.1% 33.6%* 39.9%**
(0.145) (0.144) (0.151) (0.158)
Age 55-64 21.7% -6.5% 30.9%* -9.2%
(0.133) (0.179) (0.157) (0.269)
Age >64 -16.1% -8.1% 4.3% 2.1%
(0.190) (0.194) (0.235) (0.326)
Italic number: error variance based on 30-50 obs
Standard errors are bootstrapped and in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
been estimated for di®erent partitions of the total sample. To be relatively
concise, results are only shown for the higher eligibility age expectations.
The ¯rst three tables display PRCs for relevant demographic subgroups,
while the last two tables focus on media consumption groups. It should be
noted that the subgroup PRC estimates are conditional on the partition in
the speci¯ed table only and not on other characteristics. This is because
there are only a limited number of expectation changes in publicity-poor
periods available to estimate the necessary error variance. Estimating the
Publicity Reaction Coe±cient for smaller subgroups would render these error
variance estimates unreliable. The number of observations for each estimate
in the subsequent tables can be found in Tables A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6 and A-7
in the appendix.
30Table 7 reports Publicity Reaction Coe±cients for di®erent age groups.
Table 8: PRCs for the probability of a higher eligibility age for ¯ve di®erent
education groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Primary -49.1% 27.9% .% .%
(0.608) (0.264) (.) (.)
Vocational secondary 8.7% 0.3% 23.5% 6.6%
(0.130) (0.163) (0.153) (0.237)
General secondary 24.1% -3.1% 40.9%* -2.3%
(0.199) (0.249) (0.199) (0.428)
Vocational tertiary 16.2% -1.2% 5.5% -2.4%
(0.169) (0.229) (0.302) (0.345)
Higher vocational 6.3% 2.2% 10.3% -4.9%
(0.155) (0.190) (0.214) (0.302)
Academic education -25.8% -30.7% 6.4% -58.3%
(0.317) (0.357) (0.329) (0.688)
Italic number: error variance based on 30-50 obs
No number: error variance based on <30 obs
Standard errors are bootstrapped and in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
Although it is hard to distinguish a clear pattern in the relationship between
age and the reaction to publicity, the middle age category (between 45 and
54) does display the largest publicity reaction in three out of four columns.
The PRC of the middle aged is moreover relatively large and signi¯cant
when only the very-low and very-high publicity periods are taken into ac-
count. Interestingly, the subgroup with the lowest - even negative - publicity
reaction are those individuals over the age of 64 that are already receiving
old age social security. It can be argued that once someone receives a bene¯t
she is no longer interested in news about the eligibility age as changes in this
policy will not apply to her anymore. The same mechanism could explain
that those in between 55 and 64 display a signi¯cant publicity reaction for
a change within ten years (column II) but not for a change within twenty
years.
Table 8 reports Publicity Reaction Coe±cients for education subsam-
ples. There does not appear to be a linear relationship between level of
education and the degree to which a respondent reacts to publicity. Hardly
any of the PRCs are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. What is striking how-
ever is that those respondents who managed to obtain a university degree
31Table 9: PRCs for the probability of a higher eligibility age for ¯ve di®erent
income groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Low income 1.0% 27.6%* 25.8% -0.4%
(0.175) (0.166) (0.177) (0.371)
Lower middle 19.2% -11.8% 29.7%* -4.5%
income (0.156) (0.201) (0.194) (0.330)
Middle income -9.0% 3.3% -32.0% -0.1%
(0.184) (0.198) (0.304) (0.298)
High middle 33.7%* -5.7% 37.9%* -1.3%
income (0.117) (0.235) (0.171) (0.336)
High income -2.7% -17.8% 10.3% -23.5%
(0.192) (0.226) (0.277) (0.355)
Italic number: error variance based on 30-50 obs
Standard errors are bootstrapped and in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
do not respond to publicity at all; their negative PRCs even indicate that
they change their expectations more in publicity-poor than in publicity-rich
periods. Perhaps high educated individuals have such high-quality initial
expectations that information disseminated through the media does not in-
duce them to change their policy forecasts.
The sample is strati¯ed in ¯ve income classes for the estimation of the
Publicity Reaction Coe±cients in Table 9. The ranking of income sub-
groups in terms of PRC estimates is rather di®erent over the four columns.
However, the high middle income category displayed the highest publicity
reaction in both ten years-columns, the middle income category displayed
the lowest publicity reaction in these columns and the highest income cate-
gory displayed the lowest publicity reaction in both twenty years-columns.
These di®erences between adjacent groups are surprising and suggest that
several opposing factors in°uence the relationship between income and the
publicity reaction. A possible explanation for the low PRCs of the highest
income group could be that the future of old age social security does not
interest them as they foresee enough alternative income sources.
Table 10 reports Publicity Reaction Coe±cients for media consumption
and self-reported political awareness subgroups. While focusing on news-
paper consumption, what catches the attention is that those who read the
newspaper once a week or less have the highest publicity reaction. This is
the case for all estimates, except for the ten years-horizon in the publicity-
32Table 10: PRCs for di®erent media consumption groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Average newspaper -9.9% 3.1% 14.7% -6.5%
consumption (0.113) (0.120) (0.142) (0.198)
Low newspaper 30.9% -4.3% 40.8% 9.9%
consumption (0.270) (0.264) (0.280) (0.315)
Average knowledge -5.1% -4.0% 22.4%* -12.3%
of current a®airs (0.121) (0.121) (0.136) (0.193)
Low knowledge 14.3% 31.7% -0.6% 34.1%
of current a®airs (0.214) (0.238) (0.325) (0.390)
Average television -2.3% 2.1% 20.7% -6.6%
news consumption (0.113) (0.119) (0.132) (0.188)
Low television 13.7% 2.3% .% .%
news consumption (0.262) (0.349) (.) (.)
Italic number: error variance based on 30-50 obs
No number: error variance based on <30 obs
Standard errors are bootstrapped and in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
poor versus the publicity-rich comparison. A similar picture emerges from
the results on individuals' knowledge of current a®airs in Dutch politics. In-
dividuals who themselves report that their knowledge is lower than that of
the average Dutchmen, display higher Publicity Reaction Coe±cients. This
thus means that ill-informed individuals do pick up on some of the released
publicity on the relevant topic and change their expectations accordingly.
At ¯rst, these results seem counterintuitive. If low media consumption is
however correlated with low initial knowledge of old age social security, one
can imagine that publicity should induce more changes in the expectations
of the low informed group. The television news results are in the same di-
rection, but very unprecise as the number of respondents who report low
television news consumption is low.
Finally, Table 11 shows PRC estimates for a partition of the dataset into
what type of newspaper one most often reads. Four speci¯c categories are
selected: those who obtain most information from free newspapers, those
who most often read `de Telegraaf' - a populist/ conservative newspaper,
those who most often read `de Volkskrant' - a progressive newspaper and
those who most often read `NRC Handelsblad' - a liberal newspaper. It turns
out that those who only read free newspapers and those who often read the
33Table 11: PRCs for the probability of a higher eligibility age for ¯ve di®erent
newspaper readership groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Free newspapers 19.3% 20.3% .% .%
(0.257) (0.269) (.) (.)
De Telegraaf 11.8% 33.4% .% .%
(Populist) (0.329) (0.219) (.) (.)
Volkskrant 0.9% -55.5% .% .%
(Progressive) (0.358) (0.602) (.) (.)
NRC Handelsblad 13.0% -34.5% .% .%
(Liberal) (0.317) (0.625) (.) (.)
Other -20.6% -7.5% -13.7% 13.0%
(0.156) (0.151) (0.217) (0.203)
Italic number: error variance based on 30-50 obs
No number: error variance based on <30 obs
Standard errors are bootstrapped and in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
populist newspaper have the highest publicity reactions. This could be be-
cause of the speci¯c wording in and content of the articles, but also because
the individuals that typically read these newspapers have low-quality initial
expectations. Those who read the progressive newspaper do seem not very
in°uenceable by the media in terms of their expectations. Respondents who
are in the `other newspaper' category, which includes regional and smaller
national newspapers, display the smallest publicity reaction.
All in all, the presented Publicity Reaction Coe±cients for the di®erent
demographic and media consumption subgroups paint an interesting pic-
ture. Three groups are identi¯ed that do not adapt their expectations more
strongly in high publicity-periods: those over the age of 64, those with a
university degree and the highest income group. The middle aged respond
relatively heavily to publicity in terms of their expectations, just like those
who do not often read a newspaper and those who read free newspapers
or `de Telegraaf'. Also the respondents that indicate themselves that they
know little about Dutch politics display a higher publicity reaction. Since
the PRC estimates in this section are only conditional on the characteristic
presented in each table, it it unclear what the most important determinants
of di®erential publicity reaction are. More research will be needed to un-
cover this.
Three explanations of these results come to mind that probably all ex-
34plain some part of reality. All three involve the publicity set £t that individ-
uals use as an input in their expectations formation process. First, generally
less-informed groups are more susceptible to repetitions of old news in the
media, ©t. The quality of the initial expectations of those with a university
degree and the highest income groups is probably higher than the quality of
expectations of, say, those who do not often read a newspaper. If the public-
ity set contains mostly `old' news those who did not pay enough attention to
the news before, should respond to these publicity items by shifting their ex-
pectations up or down, depending on which old news elements they absorbed
over the last period. A second explanation only concerns the Publicity Re-
action Coe±cient estimates of which type of newspaper the respondent most
often reads. As mentioned above, it is possible that the type and tone of
news that is published in free and more populist newspapers is such that
it leads to higher expectation changes by its readers. Third, as mentioned
before, some groups have lower stakes in the future of the old age social
security eligibility age so that they will hardly pay attention to the public-
ity set £t. Those already receiving a bene¯t and those who are ¯nancially
well-o® probably do not su®er much when the eligibility age goes up and
hence will ignore news on the matter.
6.3 Variance in expectation change error terms explained
As explained in Section 3.4, a side product of the estimation of the Pub-
licity Reaction Coe±cients is that one can analyze individuals' reporting
errors by investigating their expectation changes in the publicity-poor peri-
ods. Table 12 presents estimation results for regressing the log of squared
expectation changes in the low publicity periods as de¯ned in Section 5 on
several demographic characteristics. Changes in expectations are assumed
to be drawings from the reporting error variance here and the presented
regressions thus capture the factors that in°uence heteroscedasticity. The
regression coe±cients will explain which groups are more likely to provide
erroneous expectation answers.
The age group dummies turn out to be among the few signi¯cant covari-
ates in explaining how error-prone individuals are. Typically, the younger
the respondent the lower the error variance is. This means that especially
those over 64 are more inclined to randomly shift their expectations up and
down, even if no publicity forces them to do so. In the twenty years-horizon
regression, the group of people between 35 and 44 years old is the only that
is signi¯cantly less error-prone than the elderly. Income also matters sig-
ni¯cantly in explaining mistakes in the second column. Those with lower
middle incomes and middle incomes have higher estimated error variances.
In general, the explanatory power of these regressions is low, indicating that
there is large individual heterogeneity in the prediction error variances.
35Table 12: Coe±cients and standard errors of OLS models. Dependent vari-
able: logarithm of squared expectation changes in publicity-poor periods.
(1) (2)
10 years 20 years
Coef. S.e. Coef. S.e.
Age 25-34 -1.530*** (0.390) -0.217 (0.420)
Age 35-44 -0.492 (0.364) -0.701* (0.409)
Age 45-54 -0.718* (0.331) -0.435 (0.368)
Age 55-64 -0.706* (0.337) 0.300 (0.364)
Vocational secondary -0.248 (0.503) -0.362 (0.528)
General secondary 0.210 (0.535) -0.687 (0.620)
Vocational tertiary -0.464 (0.532) -0.627 (0.555)
Higher vocational -0.208 (0.521) -0.841 (0.562)
Academic education -0.184 (0.609) -0.291 (0.638)
Low middle income 0.001 (0.365) 0.956** (0.412)
Middle income 0.106 (0.376) 0.929* (0.431)
High middle income -0.329 (0.377) 0.517 (0.464)
High income -0.400 (0.446) 0.549 (0.552)
Dummy female -0.095 (0.259) 0.228 (0.292)




Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the individual level
¤ p < 0:05,
¤¤ p < 0:01,
¤¤¤ p < 0:001
Base categories: primary education, age >64, low income
367 Conclusion
As empirical evidence is accumulating that subjective expectations in°u-
ence economic decision-making and that these expectations are sometimes
biased, it becomes policy-relevant to know how to in°uence individuals' ex-
pectations. It is likely in this respect that information in the media a®ects
how people feel about the future. This paper sheds light on the role of public
information dissemination, or publicity, in a real-life expectations formation
process. More speci¯cally: I estimate the degree to which di®erent demo-
graphic and media consumption groups adapt their expectations to publicity
about the relevant random variable.
To examine demographic di®erences in the publicity reaction, one needs
data of an expectation on which private information has no in°uence in
order to circumvent identi¯cation problems. I therefore use the Pension-
barometer, a unique monthly dataset of expectations on the Dutch old age
social security eligibility age. As the relevant media attention di®ered sub-
stantially over the survey period, I am able to estimate the proportion of the
variance in the eligibility age expectation changes that can be attributed to
publicity (the Publicity Reaction Coe±cient - PRC) without making strong
assumptions on the expectations formation process.
My ¯ndings are in line with other empirical papers that suggest media in-
tensity a®ects the precision and updating of in°ation expectations (Carroll,
2003, and Lamla and Lein, 2008). For the total population, the publicity
reaction in eligibility age expectations is estimated to be in between zero and
thirty percent. Rather than publicity, random shifts thus explain the major-
ity of the variance in changes in eligibility age expectations, with especially
older individuals being more imprecise in their expectation reports. The
di®erences in the publicity reaction among subgroups are considerable how-
ever. I ¯nd that middle-aged, those who infrequently read newspaper and
those who know little about Dutch politics have a relatively high publicity
reaction. This can be understood if the majority of newspaper articles about
old age social security contains `old news' rather than real information reve-
lations. It is after all likely that those with lower quality initial expectations
adapt their expectations more whenever already available information is re-
peated in the media. Also those who report to obtain most of their news
content from either free or a populist newspaper (`De Telegraaf') change
their expectations more severely in high-publicity periods. The wording in
and content of these newspapers could explain this observation. Moreover, I
¯nd that those over the age of 64 and high income individuals do not adapt
their expectations more often in publicity-high periods. It seems as if those
with low stakes in the future of the old age social security eligibility age pay
little attention to publicity on the matter.
Provided that the explanations that I propose for my PRC results are
valid, policy-makers could learn the following about publicity and expec-
37tations formation. On the one hand, those who have low quality initial
expectations are easily in°uenced by whatever appears on the subject in
newspapers and on television. If policy-makers would like to in°uence the
expectations of the weaker informed group it would be wise to often repeat
high-quality information in the media so that eventually even they hear the
news. On the other hand, those who feel they have little to do with the
expectation at hand are hard to in°uence by public information dissemina-
tion, as they will hardly pay attention to the news. This is ¯ne when the
disinterest is justi¯ed, but rather problematic when it is not.
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41Table A-1: Overview of classi¯cation of survey weeks














19 2006 13-mei No No No No
23 2006 10-jun No No No No
29 2006 22-jul 2-apr No No Yes Yes
33 2006 19-aug 14-mei No No Yes Yes
38 2006 23-sep 11-jun No No Yes Yes
42 2006 21-okt 23-jul No No Yes Yes
46 2006 18-nov 20-aug No No Yes Yes
50 2006 16-dec 24-sep No No Yes Yes
54 2007 13-jan 22-okt No No Yes No
58 2007 10-feb 19-nov No No Yes No
62 2007 9-mrt 17-dec No No No No
67 2007 13-apr 14-jan No No No No
72 2007 18-mei 11-feb Yes No No No
76 2007 15-jun 10-mrt Yes Yes No No
80 2007 13-jul 14-apr Yes No No No
85 2007 17-aug 19-mei Yes Yes No No
89 2007 14-sep 16-jun Yes Yes No No
93 2007 12-okt 14-jul Yes No No No
98 2007 16-nov 18-aug No No No No
102 2007 14-dec 15-sep Yes No No No
107 2008 19-jan 13-okt Yes No No No
111 2008 16-feb 17-nov No No No No
115 2008 15-mrt 15-dec No No Yes Yes
119 2008 12-apr 20-jan No No Yes No
125 2008 24-mei 17-feb No No Yes No
128 2008 14-jun 16-mrt No No No No
132 2008 12-jul 13-apr No No No No
137 2008 16-aug 25-mei No No No No
141 2008 13-sep 15-jun No No No No
146 2008 18-okt 13-jul No No No No
150 2008 15-nov 17-aug No No No No
42Table A-2: Number of observations in estimation of Publicity Reaction Co-
e±cients for the total expectation changes sample
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Prob. for higher age 1,233 1,155 685 633
(744) (742) (302) (273)
Prob. for two year 1,232 1,154 684 632
higher age (744) (736) (302) (272)
Prob. for lower age 1,232 1,152 684 631
(742) (734) (301) (271)
Prob. for two year 1,231 1,152 683 631
lower age (741) (733) (301) (270)
Observations in publicity-poor periods in parentheses
Table A-3: Number of observations in estimation of PRCs for the probability
of a higher eligibility age for ¯ve di®erent age groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Age 25-34 166 150 95 83
(103) (97) (48) ( 34)
Age 35-44 231 186 133 98
(116) (117) (38) (38)
Age 45-54 304 268 166 155
(177) (198) (81) (86)
Age 55-64 279 281 146 150
(185) (173) (71) (59)
Age >64 253 270 145 147
(163) (157) (64) (56)
Observations in publicity-poor periods in parentheses
43Table A-4: Number of observations in estimation of PRCs for the probability
of a higher eligibility age for ¯ve di®erent education groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Primary 53 68 31 37
(43) (47) (18) (19 )
Vocational secondary 341 312 196 174
(232) (207) (89) (78)
General secondary 127 151 71 84
(83) (85) (40) (22)
Vocational tertiary 258 233 136 135
(146) (143) (48) (51)
Higher vocational 299 264 171 139
(156) (180) (77) (71)
Academic education 155 127 80 64
(84) (80) (30) (32)
Observations in publicity-poor periods in parentheses
Table A-5: Number of observations in estimation of PRCs for the probability
of a higher eligibility age for ¯ve di®erent income groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Low income 252 204 149 118
(150) (124) (61) (43)
Lower middle 223 255 138 131
income (151) (142) (66) (44)
Middle income 244 207 133 119
(159) (178) (56) (62)
Higher middle 256 224 134 125
income (130) (161) (62) (68)
High income 244 256 127 136
(150) (136) (57) (56)
Observations in publicity-poor periods in parentheses
44Table A-6: Number of observations in estimation of PRCs for the probabil-
ity of a higher eligibility age for newspaper consumption and self-reported
political awareness
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Average newspaper 676 627 355 313
consumption (397) (421) (153) (147)
Low newspaper 119 128 58 67
consumption (55) (78) (18) (31)
Average television 712 681 375 340
news consumption (408) (450) (151) (162)
Low television 83 74 38 40
news consumption (44) (49) (20) (16)
Average informedness 662 640 340 328
(384) (425) (145) (151)
Low informedness 133 115 73 52
(68) (74) (26) (27)
Observations in publicity-poor periods in parentheses
Table A-7: Number of observations in estimation of PRCs for the probability
of a higher eligibility age for ¯ve di®erent newspaper readership groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Free newspapers 80 91 49 53
(55) (56) (20) (28)
De Telegraaf 89 86 40 48
(Populist) (47) (49) (21) (15)
De Volkskrant 78 65 37 28
(Progressive) (46) (59) (15) (24)
NRC Handelsblad 50 57 28 26
(Liberal) (40) (31) (18) (7)
Other 459 405 243 196
(241) (280) (90) (94)
Observations in publicity-poor periods in parentheses
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